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Obtaining Early and Effective Relief
Against Trademark Counterfeiting
b NEIL A. SMITH*
Introduction
Counterfeiting has become a worldwide industry which is es-
timated to generate over a billion dollars worth of business in
the United States alone.' Widely known perfumes, designer
clothing and other brand name products have become popular
targets for counterfeiters. For example, there are documented
instances of counterfeit auto parts,' airplane parts,' computer
software,4 and even counterfeit birth control pills.
5
Trademark protection is important not only to unsuspecting
consumers, but also to trademark owners. The purpose of this
article is to discuss the many ways in which a trademark owner
can obtain early and effective relief against counterfeiters of
his products. The article will trace the recent development of
remedies for trademark counterfeiting up through the Trade-
mark Counterfeiting Act of 1984.6
I
Development of Remedies for Trademark
Counterfeiting: Seizures and Injunctions
in the Courts
A. Temporary and Preliminary Injunctions in Trademark Cases
The federal courts recently provided trademark owners with
new types of relief which can be obtained soon after a suit is
* Partner, Limbach, Limbach & Sutton, San Francisco, California.
1. Engle, Copycat Goods - Are You Buying Dangerous Fakes?, GLAMOUR, Mar.
1986, at 246. Finn, That's the Sixty Billion Dollar Question, FORBES, Nov. 17, 1986, at
40.
2. Engle, supra note 1, at 246.
3. Is it the Real Thing? ASTM STANDARDIZATION NEWS, Jan. 1986, at 17.
4. Going After the Fakes, TIME, Apr. 21, 1986, at 67.
5. Engel, supra note 1, at 246.
6. Amended that portion of the Lanhamr Act found in 15 U.S.C. § 1116-18 (1988).
It also amended 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1988).
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filed. Although temporary and permanent injunctions have al-
ways been available in the past, they were often granted weeks,
or even years, after a suit was filed. This delay gave counter-
feiters ample time to escape with the counterfeit goods. In fact,
even the most blatant counterfeiters could usually count upon
receiving threatening letters from attorneys for several weeks
before any relief was granted to trademark owners. During
this time, the counterfeit items could be diverted or sold at a
healthy profit.
The law has been changed in the last few years to eliminate
these delays. A trademark owner can now obtain an ex parte
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the movement or
sale of counterfeit goods. This prevents the blatant copier from
disposing of the goods before civil penalties can be attached.7
Trial lawyers have always been able to obtain TRO's upon a
showing of serious injury to the trademark owner and after giv-
ing the usual preliminary notice to the defendant. In the last
few years, though, some federal judges have granted TRO's
without any prior notice to the defendant. For example, in In
Re Vuitton et Fils S.A.,' Louis Vuitton, the manufacturer of
very expensive bags and luggage, filed actions against counter-
feiters of its goods. Initially, Vuitton sought to follow Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b),9 which states that the plaintiff
must try to give a defendant notice of any intention to seek a
TRO.10 However, when Judge Brieant of the Southern District
of New York refused to grant a TRO until Vuitton gave notice
to the defendant, Vuitton brought a mandamus action in the
court of appeals.1' The court ordered the district court to con-
sider granting a TRO without notice to the defendant.12
The Vuitton Court noted that the "early warning" notice to
blatant counterfeiters failed to serve its purported purpose of
giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard. Rather, it
gave the defendant an opportunity to dispose of the counterfeit
goods. When a counterfeiter was given notice that a plaintiff,
like Vuitton, was seeking a TRO, the counterfeiter could imme-
diately transfer his inventory back to his supplier or to another
7. In Re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979).
8. IiL
9. Id at 2.
10. FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b).
11. Vuitton, 606 F.2d at 1.
12. Id. at 5.
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counterfeit seller whose identity was unknown to Vuitton. 3
The Vuitton case has been cited around the country as author-
ity that, in cases of clear infringement, a court may grant a
TRO, effective when served, without giving any advance notice
to the defendant.14
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a similar deci-
sion in a case involving the same manufacturer, Louis Vuitton.
The court reversed a decision of Judge Hauk of the Central
District of California.'5 The district court refused to grant a
TRO until notice was given to the defendant, since the local
rules of court required such notice."l Unfortunately, the Ninth
Circuit ordered that the decision be neither published nor sent
to the defendant.
Despite the recent willingness of courts to grant TROs effec-
tive upon service, such orders did not always prevent counter-
feiters from disposing of the counterfeit goods. The
counterfeiter who transfers goods upon learning of an immi-
nent TRO is almost as likely to violate the TRO once it is
served. Some mechanism is needed, beyond an expensive
"stake out," to prevent violation of the order. In the case of a
defendant retail store or other business open to the public, an
investigator could count the number of counterfeit items on the
shelves before the TRO was served. However, warehouses and
storage rooms are not open to informal searches for counter-
feits. Therefore, alternative methods of protection have been
devised.
One method utilizes the discovery process under Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26 allows one to
compel the production and inspection of records and inven-
tory.'7 Once a TRO is granted, an order allowing expedited dis-
covery can be obtained. This order gives immediate access to
the defendant's records and usually access to the goods as well.
This allows the plaintiff to determine the extent of the defend-
ant's inventory. However, this approach would still not pre-
vent the defendant from disposing of the counterfeit goods
before the order allowing expedited discovery was granted.
The Northern District Court of California provided an alter-
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id at 4.
15. In re Vuitton, No. CV-79-3718 AAH (C.D. Cal. April 7, 1980).
16. Id
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
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native solution in NEA Enterprises v. American Horse.' In
NEA Enterprises, the court granted a TRO which also permit-
ted a United States Marshal to enter the defendant's premises
to photograph and inventory the counterfeit goods.'9
The circumstances in NEA Enterprises provide the classic ex-
ample of the need for an ex parte TRO along with a mechanism
for inventorying the counterfeit goods before they can be trans-
ferred elsewhere. In NEA Enterprises, the counterfeit goods, a
chemist's solvent, were being sold by large distribution compa-
nies in Seattle and Sacramento. After the counterfeit goods
were discovered, the plaintiff requested a TRO, assuming the
defendants would respect the court's order. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant was notified of the
plaintiff's intent to seek the TRO which was obtained and
served shortly thereafter. The following week, however, the
plaintiff learned that other individuals and companies were
still selling the counterfeits. When retailers asked the defend-
ants for more of the counterfeit products, the defendants
merely told the retailer that another company would now be
delivering their orders.2°
Plaintiff then filed a related action 2' along with a motion for
an ex parte TRO against the newly discovered defendants. The
court granted the TRO and also allowed a representative of the
plaintiff and the U.S. Marshal to enter the business premises of
the defendants to photograph and inventory the counterfeit
goods.
The following month, the plaintiff discovered a different
counterfeiting operation in Florida involving the same product.
The plaintiff again moved for a TRO and requested that the
Marshal be permitted to seize unattached labels.2 2 The court
once again granted the TRO without notice. The order empow-
ered the U.S. Marshal to photograph and inventory counterfeit
goods and seize any counterfeit labels.23
In subsequent cases, the courts have gone even further by al-
lowing U.S. Marshals or plaintiff's representatives not only to
18. Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA), No. 481, at A-4 (May 29, 1980) [herein-
after PTCJ].
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seize the counterfeit goods, but also to search the defendant's
premises for hidden counterfeit goods and records relating to
counterfeiting.24
In Fimab-Finanziaria Maglificio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.P.A.
v. Kitchen,25 the Southern District Court of Florida decided a
case involving popular garments sold under the brand name
FILA. The court granted a broad order which authorized the
U.S. Marshal to seize any counterfeit FILA goods or related
records found at several listed locations, including a country
club, and any vehicles found at those locations. If the defend-
ant refused to open a car trunk, the Marshal could confiscate
the car; if the defendant did not identify the records relating to
the counterfeit goods, the Marshal could take all of the records.
In another decision, Lacoste Alligator S.A. v. F. Salstein,
Inc.,2 the defendant's motion to vacate an order of seizure was
denied. The defendant had advertised the availability of
Lacoste shirts and sold counterfeits to a private investigator
who arranged for the purchase of 100 dozen shirts.'
There are certainly limits to the relief granted. In National
Football League Properties, Inc. v. Coniglio,28 the NFL ex-
pected that numerous counterfeit goods would be on the streets
of Washington, D.C. just before the Superbowl. The NFL
sought a TRO against both named and "John Doe" defend-
ants.' The court opinion, written by Judge Richey, adamantly
denied the TRO, and stated:
Even on the surface, the order requested by the plaintiff
would appear to invite catastrophe. It promises a nightmare of
jurisdictional flaws, deprivations of due process, and windfall
litigation that could ensue for years to come. This is not even
to mention the physical spectacle of the United States Marshal
service, which is already greatly overburdened in its work, in
the company of paid thugs (euphemistically styled "security
representatives") roaming the streets of Washington to confis-
cate the merchandise of small businessmen and other licensed
vendors who sell their wares in the open air. In short, the re-
24. Fimab-Flnanziaria Maglificio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.P.A. v. Kitchen, 548 F.
Supp. 248 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
25. Id
26. 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1985 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
27. Id at 987. See also Nike, Inc. v. Leslie, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (N.D. Fla.
1985).
28. 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983).
29. Id at 1225.
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lief plaintiff seeks would open a veritable Pandora's box of
problems that this court cannot even begin to imagine now.3°
The court noted that this case differed from traditional cases
since the NFL was not even manufacturing the garments or the
souvenir goods involved in the case. As a result, the court ques-
tioned whether this was a trademark infringement which
would irreparably injure plaintiff's reputation, since all that
was at stake were licensing profits:
Surely, plaintiff must jest when it contends that all of this
would be a "minimal inconvenience" to defendants and would
serve to "aid the efforts of the police department of the District
of Columbia to exercise crowd control." If anything, it would
cause great inconvenience and increase public disruptions at
some of the District's busiest interchanges.31
B. Injunction Against Unnamed, Transitory Defendants
Despite Judge Richey's concerns in the NFL case, federal
courts have been willing to grant TRO's with seizure provisions
against unnamed, transitory defendants. The general rule in
federal courts prohibits the naming of "John Doe" defend-
ants.32 However, courts are now beginning to allow the practice
because the defendants in many trademark cases are uniden-
tifiable until they appear on the street with counterfeit goods.
The typical case involves the itinerant street peddlers who
display counterfeit garments or leather goods in front of de-
partment stores. The fact that the goods are on the street,
rather than in the stores, often adds respectability to the prod-
uct. While goods in the stores sold at half price would be sus-
pect as counterfeit, the consumer often assumes that the
bargain price of street goods reflects a low overhead or that the
goods are stolen but genuine merchandise. Another typical
case involves individuals who sell counterfeit goods at rock con-
certs or sporting events. Their identities and locations are un-
known until the concert starts.
To combat such infringers, some courts have granted TRO's
which are effective against such unnamed and transitory de-
fendants. The court typically allows the Marshal to serve the
30. I,
31. Id. at 1226.
32. Joel v. Various John Does, 499 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See also Fifty
Assoc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1970); United States ex reL Lee v.
Ill., 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965).
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TRO when the defendant attempts to sell the counterfeit
goods. For example, in Cartier, Inc. v. Various John Does,3
Judge Duffy, who sits in the Southern District of New York,
granted a TRO against "all those selling bootleg Cartier goods
within two blocks of Bloomingdale's." 34 Similarly, in Moon
Records v. Various John Does,- an injunction was granted
against peddlers of bootleg T-shirts and other paraphernalia at
a rock concert.
There are limits, however. In Rock Tours v. Various John
Does,- a Birmingham, Alabama judge felt that issuing an order
against an unnamed defendant based upon the trademark
owner's ex parte application went too far. Nevertheless, the
judge did state that a local ordinance which would prohibit sell-
ing counterfeit goods at rock concerts would be a good solution
to the problem 7
As more courts grant TRO's without prior notice to the de-
fendants, the bootleggers and sellers of counterfeit goods have
developed sophisticated ways of finding out if they are about to
be enjoined. Several sellers of counterfeit T-shirts and other
counterfeit items at rock concerts have resorted to asking court
clerks whether a John Doe case has been filed. Counterfeiters
also ask their lawyers to check the docket sheet or local legal
newspaper to see if a John Doe case has been filed.
Attorneys and courts have provided several solutions to com-
bat this problem. Injunctions which apply on a nationwide ba-
sis have been granted against rock concert counterfeiters.
These injunctions allow the local marshals in various jurisdic-
tions across the nation to serve a restraining order and, in some
cases, to seize goods bearing the plaintiff's trademark.- The
theory authorizing these nationwide injunctions is that local
sellers of counterfeit goods are related as co-conspirators to the
defendant over whom the court has jurisdiction.
In other cases, instead of issuing nationwide orders which ap-
ply to all counterfeiters of a single trademark owner, the courts
33. No. 80 Civ. 6131, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
34. Id. at 9.
35. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46 (N.D. IM. 1981).
36. 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 571 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
37. I&
38. See, ag., Concert Publishing, Inc. v. Various John Does, No. 83 Civ. 4926, slip
op. (N.D. I1. Aug. 18, 1983) (court issued a temporary restraining order and a seizure
order against the sale of Robert Plant merchandise in "any district in which plaintiff
enforces this order").
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have issued "facility" orders. "Facility" orders are issued in a
local jurisdiction and allow for an injunction against all those
who try to sell counterfeit goods at a certain facility. 9 With
both the nationwide and facility orders, the counterfeiter can-
not easily look at local filings and determine that he is going to
be subject to a TRO when he shows up at the rock concert.
Courts have also expressed a willingness to grant a secrecy
order, or an order permitting the filing of a case in the judge's
chambers.40 This prevents the defendant from learning that a
suit has been filed. The case is then held in chambers until af-
ter the injunction is served. Once the suit is served on the de-
fendant, the pleadings are then transmitted to the clerk's office




The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984
A. Goods and Services under the Act
Under the Lanham Act,' "counterfeit" is defined as "a spuri-
ous mark which is identical with or substantially indistinguish-
able from, a registered mark.143  The Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984" similarly defines "counterfeit
mark" as:
a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal regis-
ter in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such
goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that
is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief is
sought knew such mark was so registered.'
Thus, the substantially indistinguishable or identical mark
39. See, e.g., Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Perloff, Various John Does, et al.,
No. 86 Civ. 5906 (September 10, 1986).
40. See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, No. 81 Civ. 5288, slip op. (N.D.
Ill. Sep. 6, 1983) (ex parte proceeding in which court issued a secrecy order, a tempo-
rary restraining order and a seizure order).
41. Under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e), a federal judge
may permit pleadings to be filed directly with the judge. This is necessary because
once a case is filed in a large metropolitan jurisdiction, a reporter is likely to notice
the filing and immediately call the defendant, asking for comments. This obviously
defeats the purpose of filing the case without notice.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
43. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1988).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1988). The Act also includes marks similar or identical to the
Olympic symbols, such as the word "Olympic," which was protected under the civil
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must be used by the infringer for the same goods or services for
which the trademark owner has registered the mark on the
Principal Register, and for which the mark is actually used.
The criminal definition of counterfeit mark6 is slightly dif-
ferent from the civil definition, but, according to the legislative
history, "the definitions are identical in substance."'47  The
criminal definition includes the requirement that the defend-
ant's use of the mark be "likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive ... ."48 This is done "to insure that no
conduct will be criminalized by the Act that does not constitute
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act."' 9
Both the criminal and civil provisions of the Act exclude
from the definition of counterfeit goods those made when the
manufacturer of the goods was authorized to use the mark.
°
Thus, if counterfeit goods are made by an authorized licensee,
the Act does not apply.5
Parallel imports, also known as gray market goods, and
"back door goods," are excluded from the Act.' Parallel im-
ports are goods authorized by the trademark owner for sale in a
foreign country which are later imported into the United
States, often "in parallel" with the authorized goods sold in the
United States. "Back door goods" are goods manufactured by
an authorized licensee which are not themselves authorized.
The term describes the manufacturer's practice of running the
plant at night and moving the additional goods bearing the
trademark out the "back door" of the manufacturing plant.
Tight supply contracts with manufacturers and suppliers pro-
vide strict remedies against such activities by unscrupulous
licensees.5
and criminal provisions of the Act. See, Int'l Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319 (1986), offf'd, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d) (1988).
47. Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, CONG. REC.
H12076-83 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Joint Statement] 12076, 12078.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(iili) (1988).
49. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12078.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(1) (1988).
51. Id
52. A question of whether the Lanham Act or the customs laws reach parallel
imports is a subject of much current debate and split decisions among the circuits. See
Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States,
790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), f'd in part rev'd in part4 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S. CL 950 (1988).
53. The Joint Statement suggests that licensors protect themselves by contract
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Finally, the Act does not extend to unregistered trademarks
or imitations of "trade dress," meaning the color, shape, or de-
sign of a product or of its packaging, unless those features have
been registered as trademarksm This does not mean that one
cannot obtain remedies such as civil seizure under the Lanham
Act in an appropriate case. However, the civil and criminal
provisions of the Act do not apply unless the mark is registered
and in use for the goods being sold by the counterfeiter.
B. The Criminal Penalties
One who intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods
or services, and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark in connec-
tion with such goods or services, receives, upon conviction, spe-
cific criminal penalties.5 For an individual committing a first
offense, the fine is not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for
not more than 5 years, or both.- For a corporation, the fine is
not more than $1,000,000. 57 Repeat offenders receive greater
penalties."M
"Traffic" is defined as to "transport, transfer or otherwise
dispose of, to another, as consideration for anything of value, or
make or obtain control of with intent to sell, transport, transfer
or dispose of."15 9 The definition is intended to include all those
in the chain of manufacture, trade and distribution of counter-
feit goods.
The criminal provisions include a scienter requirement that
the defendant has "intentionally" trafficked or attempted to
traffic in counterfeit goods or services, and, secondly, has
"knowingly" used a counterfeit mark in connection with those
goods or services.60 The legislative history makes it clear that
"intentional" means that "the Government must show that the
defendant trafficked in goods or services in question deliber-
ately, or 'on purpose'."6' However, "if a person has an honest,
good faith belief that the mark in question is not counterfeit, he
provisions, such as by liquidated damages and quality verification and inspection pro-
cedures. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12079.
54. Id.




59. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(2) (1988).
60. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12079.
61. I& at 12077.
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or she will not be liable under this bill."62 Moreover, the Gen-
eral Criminal Code governs conspiracies that attempt to traffic
or traffic in counterfeit goods.6
A criminal defendant has "all defenses, affirmative defenses
and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an ac-
tion under the Lanham Act."" The defendant has "the burden
of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, of any such af-
firmative defense."' ' The legislative history shows that such
defenses include laches and violations of the antitrust laws.
6 6
Other defenses, including the use of a generic mark, would also
apply to any criminal prosecution. It is unlikely that a defense
of abandonment would be applicable because the mark must be
in use for the Act to be violated. Printers and publishers who
were unaware that the labels or goods printed bore a trade-
mark will most likely have a defense to criminal counterfeiting
under the Act similar to those that would apply under the Lan-
ham Act.
C. Civil Remedies
1. Ex Parte Seizure Orders
The Act provides specific authority for ex parte seizure of
goods and items either bearing counterfeit marks or used for
making or applying the counterfeit mark, as well as records
documenting the manufacture, sale or receipt of items involved
in the making or selling of counterfeit goods or services.6 7
While the plaintiff must make specific showings and the court
must make specific findings for such an order,6 the Act essen-
tially codifies the existing judicial practice discussed earlier.69
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 added a new sec-
tion explicitly authorizing ex parte seizures of counterfeit
goods and related materials under certain conditions. 70 The
Act was not intended to modify preexisting law under the Lan-
ham Act where, for example, seizures are granted in the case of
62. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
63. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12077.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c) (1988).
65. I&
66. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12078.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (1988).
68. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1988).
69. See upra notes 6-45 and accompanying text.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1988).
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unregistered trademarks.7 ' Rather, the sponsors of the legisla-
tion noted that "the courts should bear in mind the policy con-
cerns that lie behind the provisions of this bill and the need to
provide procedural protections to persons against whom such
seizures are ordered."72
The purpose of the seizure order is not only to obtain the
records relating to the violation, but also to thwart the destruc-
tion, movement, and means of production. Before issuing such
an order, the court must find that only an ex parte seizure or-
der will be adequate to achieve the purposes of the Lanham
Act. The Act provides for remedies against the destruction of
the infringing goods. 73 The court must also specifically find
that the counterfeiters, or others acting in concert with such
persons, "would destroy, move, hide or otherwise make such
matter [to be seized] inaccessible to the court, if the applicant
were to proceed on notice to such person. ' 74 This finding may
be supported by a showing that similarly situated defendants,
in actions involving the same or similar counterfeit goods, have
acted in this fashion to avoid being caught with the counterfeit
goods.
75
The court must also make a finding that the person request-
ing the seizure order "is likely to succeed in showing that the
defendant used the counterfeit mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services. "76
This does not require any specific showing of the defendant's
state of mind, only that the defendant is commercially dealing
in counterfeit goods.
77
Moreover, the court must find that immediate irreparable in-
jury is likely to occur to the plaintiff or his reputation if the
seizure order is not granted.78 Courts have repeatedly held that
the distribution of infringing goods constitutes irreparable in-
jury.79 Once the use of a counterfeit mark is established, this
requirement is usually met.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
72. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12080.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(i) (1988).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(vii) (1988).
75. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12081.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iii) (1988).
77. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12081.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iv) (1988).
79. Omega Importing v. Petri-Kline Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190,1195 (2d Cir. 1971);
Vuitton, supra note 7, 606 F.2d at 4.
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The court must also balance the equities and find that "the
harm to the [seizure order] applicant of denying the application
outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the person
against whom such seizure would be ordered."s The trade-
mark holder's irreparable injury will generally outweigh the
interests of an alleged counterfeiter in retaining counterfeit
goods.
8'
The Act requires that the court make technical findings re-
garding notice to the U.S. Attorney before the seizure order is
granted.82 Since criminal remedies are available under the Act,
Congress wanted some assurance that the U.S. Attorney was
given reasonable notice of the plaintiff's intent to seek a
seizure order, and the opportunity to participate or request
that the seizure not be granted 3 Any attempts by the U.S. At-
torney to prosecute a defendant could be tainted by the civil
seizure of evidence relating to the violation.
The Act further requires that security be posted for the pay-
ment of damages recoverable as a result of a wrongful seizure."
The courts will normally require the posting of a bond to cover
the value of the goods to be seized.85 The legislative history
suggests that the "court should err on the side of caution, that
is toward larger bonds-in light of the need to protect the un-
represented defendants, and to assure that the defendant will
have an effective remedy if he or she is the victim of a wrongful
seizure.""
Additionally, the Act requires a specific description of both
the matter to be seized and the place where they are located. 7
Congress intended some flexibility under the Act because the
counterfeiting industry often involves unknown locations,
unidentifiable defendants ("John Does"), 'movable delivery
points, and hidden warehouses."
Thus, the Act follows the prior practice of allowing seizure
orders to be issued against "John Doe" defendants when the
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(vi) (1988).
81. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12081.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(2) (1988).
83. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12080.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4) (1988).
85. This is consistent with Rule 65, which requires a bond posted for a prelimi.
nary injunction in an amount set by the court.
86. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12080.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5)(B) (1988).
88. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12081.
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sellers of counterfeit goods are transitory, unidentifiable de-
fendants, such as itinerant street peddlers and sellers at swap
meets and flea markets. The Act also seems to allow either
nationwide or facilities orders based upon general locations and
the nature of the counterfeit goods being sold.
The Act further requires that the applicant trademark owner
cannot have publicized the requested seizure. This is designed
to prevent the use of these orders in publicity campaigns. 9
This ban on publicity allows the defendant to contest the pro-
priety of the seizure. The seizure order, together with support-
ing documents, is sealed by the court until the person against
whom the seizure order is directed has an opportunity to test
the order.90 The defendant has access to the file and supporting
documents once the seizure has been efffected.
After the counterfeit goods and records relating to the manu-
facture and distribution of the counterfeit goods are seized,
these materials are taken into the custody of the court.9 How-
ever, courts generally do not want custody of these goods and
records. Therefore, they are held by either the U.S. Marshal or
others acting as substitute custodians under the authority of
the court. Because the Act provides for seizure of business
records, the court must enter an appropriate protective order
covering plaintiff's discovery of the records which have been
seized.92 The legislative history discusses the use of a third
party, chosen by the court or by agreement of the parties, to
examine the records and extract the information needed with-
out revealing privileged material.9" The legislative history also
suggests in camera inspection of the key documents by the
court.94 Finally, the court may issue a protective order permit-
ing plaintiff's counsel, but not the plaintiff, to have access to
the defendant's business records.9' Limiting access to plain-
tiff's counsel is the most common form of protection.
In short, the Act adequately protects parties from abuse of
the ex parte seizure order process through procedural require-
ments and remedies for compensation in the event of wrongful
seizure.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(ii) (1988).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(8) (1988).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(7) (1988).
92. I&





2. Damages and Attorneys' Fees
The Act amends the Lanham Act" by allowing damages and
attorneys' fees in cases where the defendant is selling goods or
performing services under a counterfeit mark. When a defend-
ant intentionally and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark, the
court shall award treble damages or profits (whichever is
greater) and attorneys' fees, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances.97 In addition, the Act provides for prejudgment
interest to be awarded in the discretion of the court.9"
The legislative record states that "it will be a rare case in
which a defendant who has trafficked in goods or services using
a counterfeit mark that he or she knows to be counterfeit can
show that he or she should not be assessed treble damages.""
The congressional sponsors acknowledge that it may not be ap-
propriate to impose treble damages and attorneys' fees "when
the defendant is an unsophisticated individual, operating on a
small scale, whose conduct poses no risk to the public health or
safety, and for whom the imposition of treble damages would
mean that he or she would be unable to support his or her
family."' 00
Conclusion
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 strengthens the
remedies of the trademark owner against those who seek to
counterfeit his most valuable asset, his trademark. At the same
time, Congress has required that certain showings and findings
be made in order to protect the defendant. This balance will
provide the courts with a firm foundation for future ex parte
seizure orders and decisions in trademark counterfeiting cases.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (1988).
98. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 538
(9th Cir. 1986).
99. Joint Statement, supra note 47, at 12083.
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